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Abstract
Behaviour occurs not as isolated incidents, but within an ongoing sequence of events. The task-switching paradigm pro-
vides a useful way to investigate the impact of different events upon subsequent performance. An implication of two-stage 
task-switching models is that preparing a task without performing it might affect task readiness only to a limited extent. 
However, recent research has surprisingly shown larger switch costs following preparation (“cue-only” trials) than following 
performance (“completed” trials). We set out to conduct a rigorous comparison of the size of switch costs following cue-only 
versus completed trials. In Experiments 1 and 2, we controlled the timing between critical trial events. This had the effect 
of roughly equating, but not reversing, the relative size of switch costs. In Experiment 3, we restructured the paradigm to 
equate the predictability of cue and target events. Switch costs following cue-only trials were now smaller than those follow-
ing completed trials. These studies confirm that task preparation alone is sufficient to drive subsequent switch costs. They 
also indicate that task performance might increase the size of these costs, consistent with two-stage task-switching models. 
Switch costs appear to be affected by both the timing and predictability of trial events.
Introduction
Behaviour occurs within an ongoing sequence of events 
rather than as individual, isolated events. Therefore, it makes 
sense to study the cognitive control of behaviour in the light 
of preceding events. Such events will include covert mental 
processes such as plans and intentions that were not neces-
sarily carried out, as well as our own previous overt behav-
iour. In this paper, we aim specifically to assess the relative 
impact of preparation to perform a task versus actual perfor-
mance of that prepared task upon subsequent performance. 
In other words, we ask whether what we “know” (prepare, 
intend) has as much of an impact as what we “do” (perform, 
enact) upon what we do next.
The relative effects of “knowing” and “doing” have long 
been of interest in the psychological literature (see the recent 
review and theoretical model by Brass, Liefooghe, Braem, 
and De Houwer, 2017), where a number of examples indi-
cate that the impact of what we prepare or intend to do can 
be relatively weak compared with the impact of what we 
actually do. Patients with frontal lobe lesions have been 
observed to perseverate to a previously relevant rule despite 
being able to articulate the correct rule (Milner, 1963). 
Healthy individuals can show that they are able to under-
stand and remember a task rule, but then fail to implement it 
when required (goal neglect: Duncan, Burgess, and Emslie, 
1995). Intentions have been shown to exert less of an inter-
ference effect upon ongoing behaviour than that produced by 
actions (Waszak, Wenke, and Brass, 2008). However, doing 
might not always be more powerful than knowing: intended 
but unperformed actions can prove to be more persistent 
than those that were executed (Bugg and Scullin, 2013).
The experimental task-switching paradigm is designed 
to assess the effects of performing a task upon our subse-
quent ability to perform either the same task or a different 
task (see reviews by Kiesel et al., 2010; Monsell, 2003; and 
Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, and Verbruggen, 2010). The 
“switch cost” effect that it generates (i.e., poorer perfor-
mance for switching than repeating tasks) provides evidence 
that the task that was relevant on the previous trial affects 
the speed and accuracy of current performance. Recently, 
task-switching researchers have begun to ask whether the 
switch cost is driven by what task was prepared on the pre-
ceding trial (what was “known”), or what task was actually 
performed (what was “done”). These studies modified the 
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basic paradigm such that on a proportion of trials some of 
the usual stages of task-processing are missing. It can then 
be asked whether the remaining stages are sufficient to gen-
erate a switch cost on the subsequent trial.
Schuch and Koch (2003) ran such a study, involving 
switching between different number-judgement tasks (odd/
even and smaller/larger judgements). They eliminated the 
later stages of task-processing on a proportion of trials by 
converting them into “no-go” trials. On these trials, a no-go 
signal (either a low tone presented concurrently with the 
target stimulus or a stimulus upon which neither task could 
be performed) indicated that the prepared task should not 
be performed. The authors found that no RT switch cost 
was present on trials immediately following no-go trials. 
It was concluded that the response-selection stage of task 
performance is necessary to cause a task to persist and 
cause a subsequent switch cost and that preparation alone 
is insufficient to do so. A number of other studies have also 
shown that switch costs are absent following no-go trials 
(e.g. Astle, Jackson and Swainson, 2006; Lenartowicz, 
Yeung and Cohen, 2011; Los and Van der Burg, 2010; Ver-
bruggen, Liefooghe, Szmalec, and Vandierendonck, 2005; 
Verbruggen, Liefooghe, and Vandierendonck, 2006).
The apparent importance of task performance in driving 
the subsequent switch cost seen in these no-go studies is in 
line with some, but not all, models of task-switching. It fits 
well with the task-set inertia and task-set priming accounts 
of Allport and colleagues (e.g., Allport, Styles, and Hsieh, 
1994; Allport and Wylie, 2000), according to which perfor-
mance of a task leads to relative facilitation of performance 
on subsequent task-repeat trials and interference on subse-
quent task-switch trials. While top–down control determines 
which task is performed in those accounts, a switch between 
intended tasks is not seen to contribute substantially to the 
switch cost measure itself. The “two-stage” task-switching 
models (e.g. Meiran, 2000; Rogers and Monsell, 1995; 
Rubinstein, Meyer and Evans, 2001), which include both 
performance-driven and preparatory task-set reconfigura-
tion processes, also seem to predict that performance should 
drive at least a part of the subsequent switch cost that could 
not have been driven by preparation alone. The same seems 
to be true of the memory-based model of Oberauer, Souza, 
Druey and Gade (2013), according to which the switch cost 
includes time taken both by preparatory task-set reconfigu-
ration and by overcoming interference driven by previous 
performance. In contrast, the Cognitive Control Model of 
Altmann and Gray (2008) has priming of cue identification 
as the source of the RT switch cost, and includes no special 
role for task performance. The compound-cue model of Sch-
neider and Logan (2005), which posits no involvement of 
“tasks” as such, also puts the source of the measured switch 
cost at the stage of cue processing. Neither of these latter 
two models therefore would seem to predict a specific role 
for performance in driving an increased subsequent switch 
cost.
Lenartowicz, Yeung, and Cohen (2011) pointed out that 
the absence of any switch cost at all following no-go trials 
on which task preparation preceded the no-go stimulus (as 
in Schuch and Koch, 2003) does not seem to fit well with 
the finding that preparation can reduce the switch cost on the 
current trial. One would expect preparation on no-go trials 
to generate a switch cost measurable on subsequent trials 
with short preparation intervals, even if response selection 
was necessary to make the cost persist at long subsequent 
preparation intervals (the so-called “residual” switch cost). 
Lenartowicz et al. (2011) hypothesised that no-go signals 
might interfere with the effects of prior preparation, abol-
ishing its potential to generate a subsequent switch cost. In 
their Experiment 2, they replaced no-go trials with “cue-
only” trials, on which only a task cue was presented. Fol-
lowing a preparation interval, the trial ended with neither a 
target stimulus nor a no-go stimulus being shown. Using this 
method, Lenartowicz et al. found a substantial switch cost 
following preparation alone. That result was replicated by 
Swainson, Martin and Prosser (2017; see also similar results 
using different designs by Brass and von Cramon, 2002, and 
Desmet, Fiat, and Brass, 2012).
These cue-only studies show that preparation can pro-
duce a subsequent switch cost, in line with the idea that 
task preparation can drive at least part of the task-switching 
process. However, a new puzzling feature was evident in the 
data from both the Lenartowicz et al. (2011, Expt. 2) and 
Swainson et al. (2017, Expt. 2) studies. That is, the switch 
cost measured on trials with short preparation intervals fol-
lowing cue-only trials was approximately twice as large as 
that following “completed” trials (i.e., standard trials, where 
a target stimulus was presented after the preparation interval 
and an appropriate response executed). This pattern in the 
data was not predicted in either study (and was not tested 
for significance in Lenartowicz et al., 2011). But it may be 
important, because it does not appear to sit easily along-
side either performance-based or two-stage task-switching 
models, according to which task preparation plus task per-
formance should produce a more substantial subsequent 
switch cost than task preparation alone. Instead, it seems to 
fit rather better with preparation-based models such as that 
of Altmann and Gray (2008), as well as with the finding 
that unperformed prospective intentions can persist more 
stubbornly than those that have been performed (Bugg and 
Scullin, 2013). Hence, we aimed to establish what might 
account for the effect and whether it could be eliminated or 
even reversed if we removed potential confounds.
As well as comparing the size of switch costs at the short-
est preparation interval, we wished to obtain a further meas-
ure for comparison, one that might tell us something about 
the nature of the switch cost rather than simply its size. We 
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measured the RISC (“reduction in switch cost”) effect (Mon-
sell and Mizon, 2006; also termed the “preparation effect”, 
Rogers and Monsell, 1995), which indicates the extent to 
which an existing switch cost can be reduced during the 
preparation interval of the current trial. We hypothesised 
that a cost driven only by preparation on the preceding trial 
might be more easily overcome during preparation on the 
current trial than would a cost that followed task perfor-
mance. If so, the cost following preparation should exhibit 
a larger RISC effect than would the cost following perfor-
mance. Such a finding would fit the proposed separation 
of endogenous and exogenous processes in two-stage task-
switching models, as well as being in line with other pro-
posals that emphasise the role of performance over that of 
preparation (e.g. Allport and Wylie, 2000).
Across the three experiments, we progressively addressed 
a number of issues with previous studies, as follows. In 
Experiment 1, we addressed a possible bias associated with 
two types of between-trial interval: the response-cue interval 
and the cue-cue interval. We reasoned that differences in 
these intervals between conditions might have allowed the 
effective strength of a task to diminish more by the end of 
completed trials than by the end of cue-only trials, plausi-
bly reducing the relative size of the switch cost following 
completed trials. In Experiment 2, we aimed to prevent any 
part of the switch cost being “prepared away” before it could 
be measured, by using a 0 ms (instead of 300 ms) prepara-
tion interval. In Experiment 3, we addressed the possibility 
that participants might have been more ready to switch fol-
lowing completed than cue-only trials, potentially lower-
ing the switch costs following completed trials. To do this, 
we changed the structure of trials such that there was an 
equal likelihood of the next “stimulus event” being a cue 
or a target.
Experiment 1
This experiment eliminated an imbalance in two aspects 
of between-trial timing. First, the substantial response-cue 
interval was removed. In Swainson et al. (2017, Expt. 2), 
the response-cue interval used before short preparation 
trials was 1300 ms; in Lenartowicz et al. (2011, Expt. 2), it 
was 1500 ms. These intervals provided a potential oppor-
tunity for the task used on completed trials to be discarded 
before the subsequent trial, therefore potentially reducing 
the switch cost. No such opportunity would have been pre-
sent following cue-only trials. Second, we controlled the 
cue-cue intervals. Cue-only trials had previously always 
been shorter than completed trials (when preparation inter-
vals were matched) and as a result, substantially more time 
elapsed between the preceding cue and the current cue 
when the preceding trial was a completed trial than when 
it was a cue-only trial. (This difference was approximately 
2000 ms when preparation interval on the current trial was 
short, partly due to the presence of a response-cue interval 
already described, but also partly due to completed tri-
als including target and response events that do not occur 
on cue-only trials). It is quite feasible that a lengthened 
cue-cue interval would tend to decrease the subsequent 
switch cost (as noted by Lenartowicz et al., 2011), because 
of the decay of cue-based effects. Indeed, Altmann and 
Gray’s (2008) model of task-switching posits that access 
to the task code generated by processing the previous cue 
is critical to the size of switch costs measured on the cur-
rent trial. We could not match cue-cue intervals exactly 
across conditions, since RTs are inherently variable (and 
we wished to avoid equating intervals using a response-
cue interval, for reasons explained above). Instead, our 
solution partially reversed the previous bias rather than 
removing it, as follows. We added a new, longer (2400 ms) 
preparation interval into the design, which occurred unpre-
dictably in place of half of the previous “long” (1000 ms) 
preparation intervals on both cue-only and completed tri-
als. We then analysed trials preceded by either a cue-only 
trial with 2400 ms preparation or a completed trial with 
1000 ms preparation (plus an upper RT limit of 1400 ms). 
Hence, cue-cue interval could now never be longer follow-
ing completed trials than it was following cue-only trials.
The key question in this experiment was whether the 
switch cost (measured on trials with a short preparation 
interval) following completed trials would now be larger 
than that following cue-only trials or whether the oppo-
site pattern, seen previously, would remain. As a part of 
this analysis, we also tested whether each of the switch 
costs (i.e., following cue-only and following completed tri-
als) at the short preparation interval would themselves be 
statistically significant. In addition, we tested whether an 
increasing preparation interval on the current trial would 
enable the switch cost following cue-only trials to be more 
rapidly overcome (i.e., to show a larger RISC effect) than 
that following completed trials, again controlling for cue-
cue interval. Finally, we tested directly whether increasing 
preparation time on the preceding trial led to decreased 
switch costs, since this would support the idea that unbal-




Forty-one participants (38 female, 3 male) were tested in 
return for course credit. The age range was 18–34 years 
(median 19 years).
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Materials
The study was run on PCs running E-Prime 2.0 software 
(Psychology Software Tools, Inc., http://www.pstne t.com), 
with button–boxes for responses (Cedrus Corporation, 2003; 
Psychology Software Tools). Participants used their left and 
right index fingers to press horizontally adjacent buttons. 
Each target stimulus consisted of a coloured shape (2.5 cm 
wide) presented centrally on a black background: a circle, 
star, triangle or square coloured red, blue, yellow or green. 
For each task there were two alternative task-cueing words 
(presented in white, Courier New size 40 font, centrally on 
a black background): “COLOUR” and “HUE” cued the col-
our task; “SHAPE” and “FORM” cued the shape task. Cues 
switched on every trial to avoid confounding cue-switching 
with task-switching. Stimulus features (e.g. “red” and “star”) 
for the current trial (n) never matched those of the most 
recently presented target (trial n − 1 following completed 
trials; trial n − 2 following cue-only trials) to ensure that 
any switch costs found would be at task-level rather than 
feature-level. The response for each trial was selected first 
(at random) and then an appropriate stimulus feature map-
ping to that response was allocated (again, at random). This 
was done independently for each stimulus dimension (colour 
and shape), so response congruity was unbiased.
Procedure
Participants were each tested in a single testing session, each 
approximately 105 min long. Up to four participants were 
tested concurrently in a small room separated into “booths” 
by screens so that no participant could see any other partici-
pant’s responses or their monitor. Participants were assigned 
left-index-finger responses for two colours and two shapes 
and right-index-finger responses for the remaining two col-
ours and two shapes. (There were 36 possible combinations 
of these mappings, assigned consecutively to participants as 
each was tested. Since participants were excluded without 
reference to their assigned mappings, and only 32 partici-
pants remained following exclusions, the 36 combinations 
were not equally represented in the analysed dataset. Instead, 
data from zero, one or two participants with each of the 
36 possible mappings were included in the analysis.) These 
mappings were presented on-screen as a reminder before 
every block of trials. There were four blocks of practice tri-
als in total. First, there were 20 trials of the colour task only; 
then, 20 trials of the shape task only; then, 20 trials with 
both tasks randomly intermixed. In these first three blocks, 
all trials were completed trials, so they included presenta-
tion of a task-cue and a target stimulus and they required a 
button-press response. The preparation intervals (cue onset 
to target onset) in these blocks matched those used for the 
completed trials in experimental blocks: 50% at 300 ms, 25% 
at 1000 ms, and 25% at 2400 ms. The final practice block of 
20 trials introduced cue-only trials, in the same proportion 
as in the experimental blocks, as described below; on these 
trials a task-cue but no target stimulus was presented. Before 
this block, participants were informed that on some trials no 
target would be presented and that every target should only 
be processed according to the cue that immediately preceded 
it. At the end of the practice blocks, participants were given 
the option to repeat practice, if they were not confident of the 
rules; otherwise they proceeded to the experimental blocks.
There were 32 blocks of experimental trials, each block 
56 trials long, with a break after each block that ended 
when the participant was ready to continue. After every 
eight blocks, participants were encouraged to take a longer 
break than usual, if they wished to. Participants were asked 
to respond quickly and accurately and to try to use the cue to 
improve performance by preparing for the appropriate task.
The trial-type on each trial was selected at random 
according to a set probability (with the restriction that cue-
only trials could not occur consecutively), such that the over-
all proportions would approximate the following values. In 
terms of task transition: 50% trials involved a task-switch; 
50% trials a task-repeat. For consistency with our previous 
study (Expt. 2 of Swainson et al., 2017), 30% of trials with 
a substantial preparation interval (here, either 1000 ms or 
2400 ms) were cue-only and the remaining 70% of those 
trials were completed. Completed trials with a short prepa-
ration interval were also included, the proportion of these 
being equal to that of completed trials with a long prepara-
tion interval. Hence, the relative proportions of the differ-
ent trial-types (in terms of trial completion and preparation 
interval) out of a total of 170 were as follows: 15/170 cue-
only1000ms; 15/170 cue-only2400ms; 35/170  completed1000ms; 
35/170  completed2400ms; 70/170  completed300ms. (N.B., 
there were no cue-only trials with a preparation interval of 
300 ms.)
Figure 1 shows the timings of trial events. All trials 
began with the presentation of a cue for 200 ms and then 
a blank screen for 100, 800 or 2200 ms: this produced the 
three preparation intervals of 300, 1000 and 2400 ms. Cue-
only trials ended after the preparation interval and were 
always followed immediately by a completed trial, with no 
additional inter-trial interval occurring. Completed trials, 
however, continued after the preparation interval with the 
presentation of a target stimulus for 200 ms and then a blank 
screen until a response was recorded; RTs were timed from 
the onset of the target. The next trial (either cue-only or 
completed) began upon detection of the response. Although 
we had intended there to be no response-cue interval at all, 
a short, variable delay (below 50 ms on 99% trials; mean 
30 ms) was found to have occurred, while the software pro-
cessed a response and began the next trial; this delay did 
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not change across experimental conditions. On completed 
trials where the wrong response was made, “INCORRECT” 
was presented in magenta for 500 ms, followed by a 500 ms 
blank, before the next trial began.
Data processing
Data were processed before analysis to exclude particular 
trials and participants, as follows. Trials with RTs below 
200 ms or above 2000 ms (as in Swainson et al., 2017), 
trials following an incorrect response and the first trial of 
each block were excluded. Trials with an incorrect response 
were excluded from the analysis of RTs. Participants who 
scored less than 70% correct overall on completed trials 
in experimental (non-practice) blocks were excluded (six 
participants); among the remaining participants, those with 
more than 10% trials removed for being too fast or too slow 
were also excluded (three participants). A mean of 4% trials 
(range 0–9%) across participants were excluded from the 
final dataset for being too fast or too slow. No limit was set 
for the number of trials per participant available for each 
analysis condition, but post hoc analysis of trial numbers 
showed that in all cases at least 20 trials were included per 
analysed condition for each participant.
We controlled for cue-cue interval as follows. Where the 
preceding trial was a completed trial, it had to have had a 
preparation interval of 1000 ms and an RT no longer than 
1400 ms; i.e., total trial duration maximum 2400 ms. (Across 
participants, a mean of 11% trials, range 0–27%, were dis-
carded to meet the RT criterion applying to the previous 
trial.) Where the preceding trial was cue-only, it had to have 
had a preparation interval of 2400 ms. This meant that the 
cue-cue interval was never longer following completed than 
following cue-only trials. It is important to note that this pro-
cedure actually over-corrects the imbalance that was present 
in the previous studies (Lenartowicz et al., 2011; Swainson 
et al., 2017) rather than matching it across conditions.
Design and analysis
The design was entirely within-subjects. Dependent vari-
ables were RT and percentage errors.
Fig. 1  Timing of trial events in 
each of the trial-types in Expts. 
1–3. Images are not to scale. 
Dotted fill pattern for circle 
targets shown here represents a 
solid colour used in the experi-
ment (see methods)
200 ms 800 / 2200 ms
200 ms 800 / 2200 ms 200 ms until response
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Analysis 1 dealt with data from trials with a short 
(300 ms) preparation interval only, controlling for cue-cue 
interval as described above. The presence of switch costs on 
these trials was tested for separately according to whether 
the trials followed completed trials or cue-only trials, using 
paired-samples t tests (switch versus repeat). Then the rela-
tive size of switch costs at this short preparation interval 
(300 ms) was assessed by repeated-measures ANOVAs with 
the factors preceding trial completion (completed, cue-only) 
and transition (repeat, switch), whereby a significant inter-
action would show that whether a trial was only prepared 
(cue-only) or also performed (completed) affected the size 
of the subsequent switch cost.
Analysis 2 tested whether there was any difference in the 
rate of reduction of the switch cost with increasing prepara-
tion interval on the current trial (i.e., the RISC effect), again 
on data that controlled for cue-cue interval. Hence, this anal-
ysis included performance data from trials with a substantial 
preparation interval as well as from trials with a short prepa-
ration interval. The 1000 ms and 2400 ms preparation inter-
vals (applying to the current trial) were treated as a single 
condition in this analysis in order that sufficient trials would 
be available per analysed condition; we expected that both of 
these intervals would allow sufficient time for preparation to 
occur on the current trial. A repeated-measures ANOVA was 
run with three factors: current preparation interval (300 ms, 
[1000 or 2400 ms combined]), preceding trial completion 
(completed, cue-only) and transition (repeat, switch). A sig-
nificant three-way interaction would indicate that the size of 
the RISC effect differed according to whether the previous 
trial had been only prepared or also performed.
Analysis 3 looked for evidence that cue-cue interval 
might affect the size of switch costs at the short preparation 
interval since we had hypothesised that a difference in cue-
cue interval across conditions might have been one of the 
causes of the unexpectedly large switch costs following cue-
only trials in earlier studies. Preceding preparation interval 
(1000, 2400 ms) was used as the relevant factor here, with 
preceding trial completion (completed, cue-only) as the sec-
ond factor, and switch cost (switch cost = [switch – repeat]) 
as the dependent variable. Where the preceding trial was 
a cue-only trial, the preparation interval on that trial was 
directly related to the cue-cue interval between the preceding 
and current trials. Where the preceding trial was a completed 
trial, the preparation interval on that trial would also tend 
to affect the cue-cue interval, although less directly because 
the variable RT present on those trials would also affect the 
cue-cue interval. There was no control of cue-cue interval in 
this analysis, and therefore no restriction was placed on the 
length of RT on preceding completed trials.
Where non-significant effects were to be used to sup-
port key conclusions (specifically, conclusions regarding 
switch cost comparisons between preceding trial completion 
conditions), we supplemented the above analyses with JZS 
Bayesian t-tests (Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, and Iver-
son, 2009), using the BayesFactor package in R (t-testBF; 
Morey and Rouder, 2018). The value of the Bayes Factor 
 (BF10) reflects the strength of evidence for the alternative 
hypothesis relative to that for the null hypothesis, with val-
ues below 1 favouring the null. A  BF10 of 0.2, for instance, 
would indicate that the null hypothesis was five (1/0.2) times 
as likely as the alternative hypothesis, given the data.
Results
Data relevant to Analyses 1 and 2 are shown in Table 1 and 
Fig. 2. Data relevant to Analysis 3 are shown in Table 2.   
Analysis 1: Switch costs at the short preparation 
interval (300 ms); CCI‑controlled1
RT switch costs were significant following both completed 
trials (mean cost 44 ms, 95% CI [19, 68]), t(31) = 3.57, 
p = 0.001, dz = 0.63, and cue-only trials (mean cost 40 ms 
[10, 70]), t(31) = 2.70, p = 0.011, dz = 0.48. There was no 
significant difference between these costs (i.e., no significant 
interaction between preceding trial completion and transi-
tion), F(1,31) = 0.03, p = 0.86, 2
G
 < 0.001  (BF10 = 0.192). 
The main effect of transition was significant, with an over-




 = 0.03, as was the main effect of preceding trial com-
pletion, due to responses being slower following cue-only 





Analysis of the percentage error data showed that the cost 
of switching tasks following completed trials was signifi-
cant (mean cost 4.80%, 95% CI [2.85, 6.74]), t(31) = 5.03, 
p < 0.001, dz = 0.89, but following cue-only trials was not 
(mean cost 1.57% [− 0.67, 3.81]), t(31) = 1.43, p = 0.16, 
dz = 0.25. Correspondingly, there was a significant inter-
action between preceding trial completion and transition, 
with a smaller switch cost following cue-only than follow-
ing completed trials, F(1,31) = 5.75, p = 0.02, 2
G
 = 0.01. The 
main effect of transition was significant, F(1,31) = 16.72, 
p < 0.001, 2
G
 = 0.05, but that of preceding trial completion 
was not, F(1,31) = 2.11, p = 0.16, 2
G
 = 0.004.
1 “CCI-controlled” means that the analysis controls for cue-cue 
interval between preceding-trial-completion conditions (N.B. 
it does not fully match CCI: seeM “ethods” section for details). 
“Non-controlled”means that no such control was applied.
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Analysis 2: Effect of current preparation interval 
on switch costs; CCI‑controlled (see footnote 1)
The analysis of RT data including the longer current prepa-
ration intervals (combined over 1000 and 2400 ms) showed 
that there was no significant three-way interaction between 
preparation interval, preceding trial completion and transi-
tion, F(1,31) = 0.05, p = 0.83, 2
G
 < 0.001  (BF10 = 0.193), and 
therefore no differential RISC effect according to preceding 
trial completion. The two-way interaction between prepara-
tion interval and transition was not itself significant, so there 
was no overall RISC effect in these data, F(1,31) = 0.19, 
p = 0.67, 2
G
 < 0.001. The main effect of preparation interval 
was significant, F(1,31) = 10.84, p = 0.002, 2
G
 = 0.03, and 
interacted significantly with preceding trial comple-
tion, F(1,31) = 32.38, p < 0.001, 2
G
 = 0.04. The latency of 
responses following cue-only trials reduced with increas-
ing preparation interval on average by 91 ms, 95% CI [57, 
124], t(31) = 5.44, p < 0.001, dz = 0.96, but there was no 
such reduction following completed trials, − 1 ms [− 31, 
30], t(31) = − 0.04, p = 0.97, dz = − 0.01. Overall, there 
was a significant switch cost (main effect of transition), 
F(1,31) = 37.50, p < 0.001, 2
G
 = 0.03. The main effect of pre-
ceding trial completion was not significant, F(1,31) = 2.98, 
p = 0.09, 2
G
 = 0.004, and there was not a significant 
Table 1  Means (M) and 
standard deviations (SD) of 
performance and switch cost 
scores (RT and % errors) in 
Experiments 1–3, according to 
current preparation interval and 
preceding trial completion
Data from trials preceded by cue-only trials are shown in italics
Switch costs were calculated prior to rounding. These data are controlled for cue-cue interval as described 





Repeat Switch Switch cost
M SD M SD M SD
RT (ms)
Experiment 1
 300 ms Completed 824 100 868 109 44 69
Cue-only 887 147 927 133 40 84
 1000, 2400 ms Completed 828 122 865 118 36 60
Cue-only 798 118 836 116 39 55
Experiment 2
 0 ms Completed 1017 186 1070 193 53 96
Cue-only 1159 219 1227 221 67 136
 1000, 2400 ms Completed 884 138 908 156 24 82
Cue-only 885 163 892 149 7 92
Experiment 3
 0 ms Completed 826 128 956 155 130 107
Cue-only 1068 175 1116 195 47 58
 1000, 2400 ms Completed 783 132 848 150 65 133
Cue-only 951 161 962 170 11 103
Error (%)
Experiment 1
 300 ms Completed 5.56 6.01 10.35 7.06 4.79 5.39
Cue-only 8.04 6.75 9.60 6.93 1.57 6.21
 1000, 2400 ms Completed 8.21 6.89 11.12 7.94 2.91 5.02
Cue-only 8.65 8.14 10.10 7.68 1.45 6.42
Experiment 2
 0 ms Completed 4.01 4.52 7.37 5.31 3.36 3.97
Cue-only 4.93 5.52 8.83 8.40 3.90 6.99
 1000, 2400 ms Completed 4.41 3.94 7.94 6.26 3.54 5.90
Cue-only 5.63 5.99 6.29 4.93 0.66 6.04
Experiment 3
 0 ms Completed 4.75 4.61 9.95 8.36 5.20 7.12
Cue-only 5.00 5.34 5.36 5.10 0.36 3.76
 1000, 2400 ms Completed 6.24 8.45 12.06 11.42 5.83 10.38
Cue-only 7.08 7.73 8.02 6.96 0.94 5.56
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interaction between transition and preceding trial comple-
tion, F(1,31) < 0.01, p = 0.95, 2
G
 < 0.001.
Just as with the RT data, the RISC effect did not dif-
fer significantly according to preceding trial comple-
tion in the percentage error data (three-way interaction), 
F(1,31) = 0.85, p = 0.36, 2
G
 = 0.001  (BF10 = 0.279), and 
again no overall RISC effect (two-way interaction) was 
observed, F(1,31) = 0.92, p = 0.34, 2
G
 = 0.001. Preparation 
interval was not significant as a main effect, F(1,31) = 2.71, 
p = 0.11, 2
G
 = 0.006, and did not interact with preceding 
trial completion, F(1,31) = 1.46, p = 0.24, 2
G
 = 0.002. The 
error switch cost was significant overall, F(1,31) = 26.17, 
p < 0.001, 2
G
 = 0.03. There was no overall effect of preced-
ing trial completion, F(1,31) = 0.22, p = 0.64, 2
G
 < 0.001, but 
the interaction between transition and preceding trial com-
pletion was significant, F(1,31) = 5.05, p = 0.03, 2
G
 = 0.007. 
Error switch costs following completed trials, 3.85%, 95% 
CI [2.31, 5.39], t(31) = 5.09, p < 0.001, dz = 0.90, were on 
average larger than those following cue-only trials, 1.51% 
[0.04, 2.98], t(31) = 2.10, p = 0.044, dz = 0.37.
Analysis 3: Effect of preceding preparation interval 
on switch costs at the short preparation interval 
(300 ms); non‑controlled (see footnote 1)
Analysis of the RT switch cost data revealed a sig-
nificant main effect of preceding preparation interval, 
F(1,31) = 10.23, p = 0.003, 2
G
 = 0.04, a larger interval 
being followed by a smaller switch cost. This fits with the 
hypothesis that increasing cue-cue interval would tend to 
decrease switch costs. The effect of preceding trial com-
pletion was significant, switch cost being larger overall 
following cue-only trials than following completed trials, 
F(1,31) = 4.60, p = 0.04, 2
G
 = 0.04. This result therefore 
replicates the pattern seen in previous studies which also 
did not control cue-cue interval. The interaction between 
preceding preparation interval and preceding trial comple-
tion was not significant, F(1,31) = 3.42, p = 0.07, 2
G
 = 0.02.
Analysis of the percentage error data revealed neither 
a significant reduction in switch cost as the preceding 




  = 0.008, nor a significant interaction of preceding 
preparation interval with preceding trial completion, 
F(1,31) = 0.78, p = 0.38, 2
G
 = 0.005. The main effect of 
preceding trial completion was significant, with switch 
costs following cue-only trials being larger than those 
Fig. 2  Switch costs ([switch – 
repeat] performance, in terms 
of mean RT and mean % errors) 
in Expts. 1–3, according to cur-
rent preparation interval (left, 
300 or 0 ms; right, combined 
across 1000 and 2400 ms), 
and preceding trial completion 
(PTC: Compl = completed; 
CO = cue-only). These data are 
controlled for cue-cue interval 
as described in the text and are 
relevant to Analyses 1 and 2 
in each experiment. Error bars 
show 95% confidence intervals. 
For data on repeat and switch 
trials separately, see Table 1
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The main result from Experiment 1 is that when cue-cue 
interval was controlled, RT switch costs at the short prepara-
tion interval were approximately equal following cue-only 
and completed trials. When cue-cue interval was not con-
trolled, in contrast, switch costs were larger following cue-
only than completed trials, as in previous studies (Lenartow-
icz et al., 20112; Swainson et al., 2017). Further, increasing 
preparation interval on the preceding trial significantly 
decreased switch costs on the current trial. Together, these 
results indicate that unbalanced cue-cue intervals probably 
accounted at least partly for the surprisingly large switch 
costs following cue-only trials seen in previous studies.
In terms of the error data, the switch cost was signifi-
cantly larger following completed than cue-only trials, when 
controlling cue-cue interval, providing possible support for 
the hypothesis that performance does contribute something 
to the size of the subsequent switch cost that preparation 
alone does not. However, we note that this effect was not to 
be replicated in Experiment 2 (below).
We analysed RISC effects (with data controlled for cue-
cue interval) to test whether switch costs following prepara-
tion versus performance would be differentially vulnerable 
to preparation on the current trial. We hypothesised that the 
cost following preparation might be more easily (and there-
fore more rapidly) overcome during preparation on the cur-
rent trial than the cost following performance would. We saw 
no evidence of this. There was no RISC effect at all evident 
in the RT data; in the error data, it was the switch cost fol-
lowing completed trials that showed the larger RISC effect. 
This may have been simply due to this cost being higher at 
the 300 ms preparation interval, and therefore having fur-
ther to fall towards zero than was the case for the analogous 
switch cost following cue-only trials.
With respect to what these results can say about the rela-
tive effects of preparation versus performance on the size of 
Table 2  Means (M) and 
standard deviations (SD) of 
performance and switch cost 
scores (RT and % errors) on 
trials with a short current 
preparation interval (300 ms, 
Expt. 1; 0 ms, Expt. 2) in 
Experiments 1 and 2, according 
to preceding preparation 
interval and preceding trial 
completion
Data from trials preceded by cue-only trials are shown in italics
No control was imposed over cue-cue interval in these data. It is the switch cost scores (not the repeat and 





Repeat Switch Switch cost
M SD M SD M SD
RT (ms)
Experiment 1
 1000 ms Completed 839 106 876 113 38 66
Cue-only 854 123 950 120 96 89
 2400 ms Completed 852 113 880 121 29 85
Cue-only 887 147 927 133 40 84
Experiment 2
 1000 ms Completed 1030 189 1090 192 60 89
Cue-only 1124 202 1241 238 117 117
 2400 ms Completed 1058 192 1099 198 41 94
Cue-only 1159 219 1227 221 67 136
Error (%)
Experiment 1
 1000 ms Completed 5.50 5.85 10.07 6.80 4.57 4.90
Cue-only 7.32 6.54 10.65 7.39 3.34 5.66
 2400 ms Completed 5.87 6.02 10.25 6.71 4.38 6.11
Cue-only 8.04 6.75 9.60 6.93 1.57 6.21
Experiment 2
 1000 ms Completed 4.06 4.61 7.07 5.22 3.01 3.86
Cue-only 5.09 4.74 9.40 9.25 4.32 6.67
 2400 ms Completed 3.99 4.06 6.02 5.66 2.03 4.31
Cue-only 4.93 5.52 8.83 8.40 3.90 6.99
2 N.B. This effect in Lenartowicz et al. (2011) was not tested for sig-
nificance, but was of a similar relative size to that found to be signifi-
cant in Swainson et al. (2017).
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subsequent switch costs, it is important to note that we did 
not match cue-cue intervals between preceding trial com-
pletion conditions in this design. Rather, we replaced a bias 
in one direction in the previous studies (larger interval fol-
lowing completed trials) with a somewhat smaller bias in 
the other direction here.3 So should we now suspect that 
the switch cost following cue-only trials is now relatively 
under-estimated and that it is in fact at least as large as that 
driven by performance? Before drawing such a conclu-
sion, we need to consider that we may have been unable 
to observe the full switch cost in this design. The shortest 
preparation interval was 300 ms (as it had been in Expt. 2 
of Swainson et al., 2017; in Lenartowicz et al., 2011, Expt. 
2, it was 350 ms). This may have been long enough to allow 
a substantial part of the switch cost driven by the preceding 
trial to be “prepared away” before target onset, as is seen in 
the RISC effect. Any part of the switch cost eliminated prior 
to target onset would not be captured within the RT. Hence, 
it could be that some aspect of the total switch cost might 
(consistent with two-stage task-switching theory) be driven 
only by performance, but that even the short preparation 
interval was too long to capture it in this experiment. This 
possibility was disallowed in Experiment 2, where the short 
preparation interval was 0 ms.
Experiment 2
This experiment and its aims were very similar to those of 
Experiment 1. The main difference was that all trials with a 
300 ms preparation interval (these were all completed trials) 
were replaced with trials on which the preparation interval 
was 0 ms—i.e., the cue and target appeared simultaneously. 
Again, we aimed to assess the following: the presence and 
relative size of switch costs following completed versus cue-
only trials, when measured with a short (zero) preparation 
interval; whether there would be a difference in how rapidly 
those costs could be overcome with increasing preparation 
time on the current trial; and whether increasing cue-cue 
intervals diminish the switch cost.
Method
Participants
Thirty-nine participants (31 female, 8 male) were tested in 
total, in return for course credit or monetary reimbursement. 
The age range was 17–25 years (median 19 years).
Materials
These were the same as for Experiment 1 except that the font 
size for cues was reduced to 28 point to improve the visual 
balance between cues and targets.
Procedure
This was based closely on that for Experiment 1, with a 
few key differences. The 300 ms preparation intervals were 
all replaced with 0 ms intervals. On these trials, the cue 
and target were displayed simultaneously with the cue word 
overlaid upon the target (see Fig. 1). The durations of the 
cue and target stimuli on all trials were increased to 400 ms 
to prevent trials with no preparation from being too diffi-
cult. The duration of the blank screen that followed cues 
was correspondingly reduced to 600 ms and 2000 ms, so that 
the overall preparation intervals remained as 1000 ms and 
2400 ms. Incorrect responses were signalled by the screen 
turning pink for 500 ms and then black for 2000 ms. As 
in Experiment 1, although we had intended there to be no 
response-cue interval here, a short, variable delay was found 
to have occurred, while the software processed a response 
and began the next trial. This delay was below 80 ms on 99% 
trials, with a mean of 37 ms prior to trials with preparation 
and 46 ms prior to trials with no preparation. It did not dif-
fer according to whether it preceded switch or repeat trials.
Data processing
We tested participants until we had data from 36 partici-
pants following exclusion and replacement of participants 
(see below).4 This sample size allowed us to test for effects 
with at least a “medium” effect size (Cohen’s d = 0.5) with 
80% power, whilst allowing full counterbalancing of col-
our and shape feature-response mappings in the analysed 
dataset. Trials with RTs below 200 ms or above 3000 ms 
were excluded from analysis. (N.B., the original upper limit 
of 2000 ms would have led to exclusion of a large number 
of participants, because responses were slower overall than 
4 The data-processing procedure was preregistered on the Open 
Science Framework, https ://osf.io/4zwb8 , where this experiment is 
termed “Experiment 1”.
3 In this experiment, cue-cue interval following completed trials was 
around 1850 ms (1000 ms preparation interval plus approx. average 
RT 850  ms), whereas that following cue-only trials was 2400  ms; 
hence, the difference between conditions in cue-cue interval was 
approximately 550 ms on average in this experiment. The equivalent 
difference in Swainson et al. (2017, Expt 2) was 2000 ms in the oppo-
site direction.
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in Experiment 1, probably due to the simultaneous pres-
entation of cues and targets on some trials.) Trials follow-
ing an incorrect response and the first trial of every block 
were also excluded. Trials with an incorrect response were 
excluded from the analysis of RTs. No participants had to 
be excluded for achieving less than 70% accuracy overall on 
completed trials in experimental blocks. Three participants 
were excluded because more than 10% trials were removed 
from the analysis for being too fast or too slow; these were 
replaced with new participants using the same feature-
response mappings. A mean of 2% trials (range 0–9%) 
across participants were excluded from the final dataset for 
being too fast or too slow. As in Experiment 1, no limit was 
set for the number of trials per participant available for each 
analysis condition, and since the data processing pathway 
was preregistered, none was imposed at the analysis stage. 
A post hoc analysis of trial numbers showed that at least 20 
trials were included per analysed condition for each par-
ticipant except for in a single case (one condition, for one 
participant, relevant to Analysis 3 only), where only 16 trials 
were available.
Cue-cue interval was controlled for as in Experiment 1. 
Across participants, a mean of 15% trials (range 1–38%) 
were discarded to ensure that preceding completed tri-
als (preparation interval 1000 ms) had RTs no longer than 
1400 ms.
Design and analysis
These exactly match the design and analysis of Experiment 
1.5
Results
Data relevant to Analyses 1 and 2 are shown in Table 1 and 
Fig. 2. Data relevant for Analysis 3 are shown in Table 2.
Analysis 1: Switch costs at the short preparation 
interval (0 ms); CCI‑controlled (see footnote 1)
RT switch costs were significant following both completed 
trials (mean cost 53 ms, 95% CI [20, 85]), t(35) = 3.27, 
p = 0.002, dz = 0.55 and cue-only trials (mean cost 67 ms 
[21, 113]), t(35) = 2.97, p = 0.005, dz = 0.50. Although 
the switch cost following cue-only trials was numeri-
cally larger than that following completed trials, there 




 < 0.001  (BF10 = 0.226). Overall, responses on switch 
trials were slower than on repeat trials, F(1,35) = 13.04, 
p < 0.001, 2
G
 = 0.02, and responses were slower when the 
preceding trial was cue-only than when it was completed, 
F(1,35) = 45.59, p < 0.001, 2
G
 = 0.12.
Percentage error switch costs were significant follow-
ing both completed trials (mean cost 3.36%, 95% CI [2.02, 
4.70]), t(35) = 5.08, p < 0.001, dz = 0.85, and cue-only tri-
als (mean cost 3.90% [1.54, 6.27]), t(35) = 3.35, p = 0.002, 
dz = 0.56. Although the switch cost following cue-only 
trials was numerically the larger of the two, there was no 
significant difference, F(1,35) = 0.19, p = 0.67, 2
G
 < 0.001 
 (BF10 = 0.196). Overall, there was a higher percentage of 
errors on switch trials than on repeat trials, F(1,35) = 25.95, 
p < 0.001, 2
G
 = 0.08. There was no overall effect of preceding 
trial completion, F(1,35) = 3.04, p = 0.09, 2
G
 = 0.01.
Analysis 2: Effect of current preparation interval 
on switch costs; CCI‑controlled (see footnote 1)
Numerically, the RISC effect in RTs was slightly larger 
following cue-only trials than following completed trials; 
however, this difference (i.e., the three-way interaction) 




 < 0.001  (BF10 = 0.306). The RISC effect was signifi-




 = 0.004. The main effects of preceding trial completion, 
F(1,35) = 28.87, p < 0.001, 2
G
 = 0.04, and preparation inter-
val, F(1,35) = 180.96, p < 0.001, 2
G
 = 0.29, were both sig-
nificant: RTs were faster following completed than cue-only 
trials and on trials with a preparation interval (1000,2400 ms 
combined) than on trials without (0 ms). These two fac-




 = 0.05, showing that RTs reduced more with increas-
ing preparation interval following cue-only than following 
completed trials. The switch cost was significant overall, 
F(1,35) = 14.30, p < 0.001, 2
G
 = 0.01, and was not signifi-
cantly affected by preceding trial completion, F(1,35) < 0.01, 
p = 0.96, 2
G
 < 0.001.
In the error data, although numerically it appeared that 
the RISC effect following cue-only trials might be steeper 
than that following completed trials, the three-way inter-




 = 0.006  (BF10 = 0.609). Only the main effect of transi-
tion (indicating an overall switch cost) was significant in 
this analysis, F(1,35) = 34.07, p < 0.001, 2
G
 = 0.06. All other 
effects were non-significant: main effects of preparation 
interval, F(1,35) = 0.21, p = 0.65, 2
G
 < 0.001, and preceding 
trial completion, F(1,35) = 1.57, p = 0.22, 2
G
 = 0.002; and the 
two-way interactions between preparation interval and pre-
ceding trial completion, F(1,35) = 1.70, p = 0.20, 2
G
 = 0.004, 
between preparation interval and transition, F(1,35) = 2.41, 
p = 0.13, 2
G
 = 0.005, and between preceding trial completion 
and transition, F(1,35) = 1.82, p = 0.19, 2
G
 = 0.003.
5 Only the intention to run the three-way ANOVA used in Analysis 2 
was preregistered.
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Analysis 3: Effect of preceding preparation interval 
on switch costs at the short preparation interval 
(0 ms); non‑controlled (see footnote 1)
As in Experiment 1, analysis of the RT data (see Table 2) 
showed that a larger preparation interval on the preced-
ing trial led to smaller switch costs on the current trial, 
F(1,35) = 5.83, p = 0.02, 2
G
 = 0.02. This effect did not 
interact significantly with preceding trial completion, 
F(1,35) = 1.29, p = 0.26, 2
G
 = 0.005. Switch costs follow-
ing cue-only trials were larger overall than those following 




 = 0.04, mirroring the analogous result in Experiment 1.
No effects were significant in the analysis of percentage 
error data: main effect of preceding preparation interval, 
F(1,35) = 0.97, p = 0.33, 2
G
 = 0.004; main effect of preceding 
trial completion, F(1,35) = 2.34, p = 0.13, 2
G
 = 0.02; interac-




The outcome of Experiment 2 was similar to that of Experi-
ment 1. With control over cue-cue interval, switch costs on 
trials with no preparation interval were roughly equivalent in 
size between preceding trial completion conditions (numeri-
cally slightly larger following cue-only than completed 
trials) and were significant following both types of trial. 
Therefore, we have no reason to think that part of the perfor-
mance-driven switch cost had been rendered unobservable 
by being prepared away prior to target onset in earlier experi-
ments. More importantly, we again did not find any evidence 
that performance adds anything to the size of the subsequent 
switch cost at short/zero (current) preparation intervals, over 
and above that contributed by preparation alone.
As in Experiment 1, when we reanalysed the data without 
controlling cue-cue interval, we found that a significantly 
longer preparation interval on the preceding trial (and there-
fore a longer cue-cue interval) led to significantly smaller 
switch costs on the current trial and the relatively large 
switch cost following cue-only trials re-emerged. Hence, 
this result again supports the idea that unbalanced cue-cue 
intervals had contributed to the large switch costs following 
cue-only trials in previous studies (Lenartowicz et al., 2011; 
Swainson et al., 2017).
Unlike in Experiment 1, the RISC effect (analysed in 
data controlled for cue-cue interval) was significant overall 
here (in RTs), possibly because the 0 ms preparation inter-
val in this experiment provided a greater contrast with the 
long (1000 ms and 2400 ms combined) preparation interval 
condition. Numerically, the pattern of RISC effects across 
preceding trial completion conditions (i.e., a bigger RISC 
effect following cue-only than completed trials) appeared 
consistent with our hypothesis that switch costs driven only 
by preparation on the preceding trial might be more easily 
overcome during preparation on the current trial than those 
driven by performance would. However, the interaction 
was not significant in either the RT or the error data. Future 
studies (perhaps with greater power to measure switch costs 
across a range of preparation intervals) may be able to offer 
a more conclusive answer to this question.
To return to the question of the relative magnitude of 
switch costs at short/zero preparation intervals, can we now 
conclude that these are at least as large following cue-only 
trials as following completed trials? We wished to rule 
out a further confound before drawing this conclusion. In 
Experiment 3, we introduced a new design to control for 
the differential expectancies of event types following cue-
only and completed trials that had been present in previous 
experiments.
Experiment 3
So far, in the studies of subsequent switch costs using cue-
only or no-go trials, those trials have been relatively rare. 
(For example, 30% of long preparation trials were cue-only 
in Experiments 1 and 2 here and also in Swainson et al., 
2017; 25% of all trials were cue-only in Lenartowicz et al. 
2011, Expt. 2; 25% of all trials were no-go in Schuch and 
Koch, 2003). There is a good reason for making these trials 
rare: participants may well be less likely to prepare a task 
in advance of target presentation if there is a high likeli-
hood that a target will never appear on that trial. If there is 
no preparation, its effects on the subsequent trial cannot be 
tested. However, the rarity of cue-only/no-go trials, together 
with the restriction that these trials never occur consecu-
tively, causes an imbalance in the relative frequency of sub-
sequent events, as follows. Following a completed trial, there 
is a 100% likelihood that the next stimulus event will be the 
onset of a task-cue, with a 50% likelihood of that cue signal-
ling a task-switch. Assuming that participants are sufficiently 
sensitive to these probabilities, we might say that following 
a completed trial they will be “50% ready” to switch tasks. 
Following a cue-only trial, in contrast, participants will tend 
to expect a target to be presented next, rather than the next 
trial’s cue. This is because cue-only trials are identical to the 
preparation stage of completed trials and they occur much 
less frequently than completed trials do. Following a long 
preparation interval, there will be only a 30% chance that 
the next event will be the onset of a task-cue (versus 70% 
chance of it being a target), half of these cues (15% of the 
total) signalling a task-switch. We might say therefore that 
participants are only “15% ready” to switch tasks following 
a cue-only trial. This difference in switch-readiness (50% 
vs. 15%) following completed versus cue-only trials might 
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mean that any cost of task-switching is increased in the rarer 
condition, because the participant has to first make a larger 
adjustment to the idea that there is a need to switch tasks 
before actually doing so. This adjustment could feasibly con-
tribute to the switch cost measured following cue-only trials.
To equate the frequencies of cue and target events across 
a block of trials, we made substantial changes to the usual 
structure of trials adopted in cued task-switching designs. 
Instead of construing a standard trial as a sequence of cue, 
target and response events we instead construe a trial here as 
one of the following: (i) a simultaneous cue and target (plus 
a response); (ii) a cue only (plus preparation time); (iii) a tar-
get only (plus a response). We dropped the requirement for 
cue-only trials not to occur consecutively and instead pre-
sented the three “trial” types with equal likelihood follow-
ing every type of trial. During data analysis, we identified 
sequences of these “trials” which corresponded to the same 
sequences of trial events constituting the trial sequences ana-
lysed in Experiments 1 and 2.
The inclusion of target-only trials, where the task from 
the preceding trial would necessarily repeat, had another 
beneficial effect. Following response-selection on any cue-
target or target-only trial there was now a reason to maintain 
preparation of that trial’s task up until the presentation of the 
next stimulus event (in case the next trial was a target-only 
trial). Cue-only trials have always required the prepared task 
to be maintained in this way, but it has not been the case 
following completed trials (in Expts. 1 or 2 here, or in the 
previous cue-only studies by Lenartowicz et al., 2011 or 
Swainson et al., 2017). Hence, this is another way in which 
preceding trial completion conditions are better matched in 
this experiment than previously.6
Methods
Participants
Forty-two participants (36 female) were tested in total, in 
return for course credit or monetary reimbursement. The age 
range was 17–32 years (median 20 years).
Materials
These were the same as for Experiments 1 and 2, except 
for the way that task-cues were presented. Cue-words (Arial 
Black font, size 20, presented in white) were displayed 
within a grey rectangle for visual clarity. When cue and tar-
get were simultaneous, the coloured-shape target was shown 
as if behind the grey rectangle (see Fig. 1).
Procedure
Participants were tested across two testing sessions (with no 
restriction on time between sessions), each approximately 
70–90 min long, in order to collect sufficient trials within 
key conditions. The procedure was identical across both ses-
sions, including practice. Four participants did not complete 
all of both sessions due to time constraints (they completed 
at least 80% of the experimental trials), but their data were 
included as long as they were able to contribute sufficient 
trials (see below). Participants first practised the colour and 
shape tasks individually for 30 trials each (including all three 
trial-types—cue-target, cue-only and target-only). Then both 
tasks were intermixed, first for a 30-trial practice block and 
then a longer 102-trial practice block.7 There then followed 
32 experimental blocks, each composed of 76 trials. After 
every block, participants were informed of the number of 
errors they had made and their mean RT during that block 
and participants started the next block when they were ready. 
The after-block feedback was introduced in Experiment 3 
in an attempt to motivate participants to perform well, and 
thereby to avoid having to exclude participants unnecessar-
ily because of poor performance. As in Experiments 1 and 
2, participants were encouraged to take a break after every 
block and to take longer breaks after every eight blocks.
Importantly, what constituted a trial in this experiment 
was very different from Experiments 1 and 2 and from 
standard task-switching experiments (see Fig. 1). On each 
trial, the trial-type was selected at random such that there 
was a 1/3 chance of each of the following trial types being 
selected: cue-target (CT); cue-only (CO); target-only (TO). 
On cue-target trials, the task-cue was shown superimposed 
upon a coloured-shape target for (a maximum of) 800 ms, 
followed by a blank screen until a response was registered. 
Cue-only trials consisted of a task-cue displayed for 800 ms, 
followed by a blank screen for either 200 or 1600 ms (with 
a 50% chance of each duration being selected), producing 
preparation intervals of 1000 and 2400 ms as in Experiments 
1 and 2. Target-only trials consisted of only a coloured-shape 
target stimulus being presented for (a maximum of) 800 ms, 
followed by a blank screen until a response was registered. 
Participants were instructed to continue to use a cue to deter-
mine which task to use until another cue was shown, and the 
first trial in a block was never a target-only trial. On both 
cue-target and target-only trials, the execution of a response 
initiated either error feedback or the onset of the next trial’s 
display. As in the previous two experiments, although we 
had intended there to be no post-response interval, a short, 
variable delay (below 50 ms on 99% trials) was found to 
6 We thank Agnieszka Kowalczyk for pointing this out.
7 The length of this practice block had been intended to match the 
experimental blocks but was coded as 102 trials in error.
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have occurred, while the software processed the preceding 
response and began the current trial. This delay was around 
6 ms longer when cue and target were shown simultaneously 
on the current trial than when either a cue or target were 
shown alone (mean 33 ms vs. mean 27 and 28 ms, respec-
tively), but importantly it did not differ between switch and 
repeat trials.
Data processing (see footnote 8)
RTs below 200 ms or above 3000 ms were not analysed. Tri-
als with an incorrect response were excluded from being the 
preceding trial of any analysed trial sequence (see Fig. 3), 
and from being the current trial in RT analyses. All trials 
contributing to the preceding and current trials had to fall 
entirely within the current block. Two participants who 
scored less than 70% correct overall on trials requiring a 
response (cue-target, target-only) in experimental blocks 
were excluded. No further participants had to be excluded 
on the basis of more than 10% of their trials being too fast 
or too slow. Since the specific trial sequences required for 
analysis were rare and occurred probabilistically, we wished 
to ensure that data were not included in analyses where they 
were averaged from only relatively few instances of that 
sequence type. Therefore, we also excluded participants 
from all analyses if they were able to contribute fewer than 
20 of any of the trial sequences required for analysis (as 
shown in Fig. 3), following trial exclusions as described 
above. Four further participants were excluded for this rea-
son. All excluded participants were replaced with new par-
ticipants using the same feature-response mappings. A mean 
of 2% trials (range 0–7%) across participants were excluded 
from the final dataset for being too fast or too slow.
Cue-cue interval was controlled for as in Experiments 
1 and 2. Across participants, a mean of 13% trials (range 
0–29%) were discarded to ensure that preceding RTs for 
completed tasks were no longer than 1400 ms.
Design and analysis8
Analyses 1 and 2 were equivalent to those in Experiments 1 
and 2. Analysis 3 was different, however: in this experiment, 
this analysis looked specifically for evidence of pre-target 
task preparation. Figure 3 shows the sequences of trials used 
in these analyses.
Analyses 1 and 2 required that we defined sequences 
of trials to correspond to the “cue-only” and “completed” 
Analysis 1
CO1000 (task-repeat; preceding trial completed; current PI zero)
CO1000 (task-switch; preceding trial completed; current PI zero)
CO2400 (task-repeat; preceding trial cue-only; current PI zero)
CO2400 (task-switch; preceding trial cue-only; current PI zero)
Analysis 2
CO1000 (task-repeat; preceding trial completed; current PI zero)
CO1000 (task-switch; preceding trial completed; current PI zero)
CO2400 (task-repeat; preceding trial cue-only; current PI zero)
CO2400 (task-switch; preceding trial cue-only; current PI zero)
CO1000 (task-repeat; preceding trial completed; current PI long)
CO1000 (task-switch; preceding trial completed; current PI long)
CO2400 (task-repeat; preceding trial cue-only; current PI long)
CO2400 (task-switch; preceding trial cue-only; current PI long)
Analysis 3
(task-repeat; current PI zero)
(task-switch; current PI zero)
(task-repeat; current PI long)

































Fig. 3  Trial sequences entered into Analyses 1–3 in Expt. 3. 
CT = cue-target; CO = cue-only; TO = target-only; PI = preparation 
interval. (N.B. CT trials and CO → TO trial sequences are both clas-
sified as “completed trials” in this experiment.) Spacing of items 
roughly represents the relative timings across trials. Trials shown to 
the left of the vertical dashed line combine to correspond to the “pre-
ceding trial” of Analyses 1 and 2, and those to the right combine to 
correspond to the “current trial” of those analyses. The underscored 
trial indicates that from which performance data were obtained for 
each analysed trial-sequence. N.B. Data in Analysis 3 were converted 
to switch cost scores before being statistically analysed
8 Data-processing procedure and analyses were preregistered on the 
Open Science Framework, https ://osf.io/yqc9q /
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trial-types used in the previous experiments. Cue-only (CO) 
trials were already present in the new design. Completed tri-
als were defined as corresponding to either cue-target (CT) 
trials or sequences of cue-only → target-only (CO → TO) 
trials. We controlled for cue-cue interval with an analogous 
procedure to that used in Experiments 1 and 2. Specifically, 
where the preceding trial-type was “completed”, the prepa-
ration interval on the CO trial of the CO → TO sequence was 
1000 ms and the TO trial had a maximum RT of 1400 ms. 
Where the preceding trial-type was “cue-only”, its prepara-
tion interval was 2400 ms. (See Fig. 3, top and middle, for 
the relevant trial sequences).
Analysis 1 examined the switch cost on trials with no 
preparation interval (i.e., on cue-target trials) according to 
whether the preceding trial’s task had been performed or 
only prepared. The existence of the switch cost was tested 
for using t tests (repeat versus switch) within each preced-
ing-trial-completion condition. These costs were compared 
with each other via a repeated-measures ANOVA with fac-
tors transition (repeat, switch) and preceding trial comple-
tion (completed, cue-only).
Analysis 2 examined the effect of the current preparation 
interval on switch costs. Preparation time for the current task 
was collapsed across the 1000 ms and 2400 ms intervals. 
These data were entered into a repeated-measures ANOVA 
with the factors transition9 (repeat, switch), preceding trial 
completion (completed, cue-only) and current trial prepara-
tion (0 ms, [1000 or 2400 ms, combined]).
Analysis 3 tested specifically for evidence (in the form 
of a RISC effect) that participants were preparing a spe-
cific task during the preparation interval. This analysis was 
included because the probability of having to implement a 
task cued on a cue-only trial was much lower in this para-
digm than in the previous two experiments: only one-third 
of cue-only trials in the current paradigm would be followed 
by a target-only trial requiring that cued task to be imple-
mented. The RISC effect (a reduced switch cost when prepa-
ration time was available on the current trial) should provide 
evidence that such preparation was taking place. Because we 
wanted to be able to use the results of this analysis to infer 
whether participants would have prepared tasks on cue-only 
trials, this analysis looked specifically at the RISC effect 
under exactly the same conditions that applied to cue-only 
trials, i.e., on trials following (any type of) completed trials. 
No control was imposed over cue-cue interval. The relevant 
trial sequences for this analysis are shown in Fig. 3 (bot-
tom). A one-tailed t test examined whether the RISC effect 
([switch cost on trials with no preparation]—[switch cost 
with either 1000 or 2400 ms preparation]) was significantly 
greater than 0 ms.
Results
Analysis 1: Switch costs at the short preparation 
interval (0 ms); CCI‑controlled (see footnote 1)
RT switch costs were significant following both completed 
trials (mean cost 130 ms, 95% CI [94, 166]), t(35) = 7.28, 
p < 0.001, dz = 1.21, and cue-only trials (mean cost 47 ms, 
[28, 67]), t(35) = 4.88, p < 0.001, dz = 0.81. The repeated-
measures ANOVA showed that the cost following completed 
trials was significantly larger than that following cue-only 
trials, F(1,35) = 23.97, p < 0.001, 2
G
 = 0.02. The overall 




 = 0.07; there was also a significant overall cost of the 
preceding trial being cue-only rather than completed 
F(1,35) = 151.23, p < 0.001, 2
G
 = 0.28.
In terms of percentage errors, while switch costs were sig-
nificant following completed trials (mean cost 5.20%, 95% 
CI [2.79, 7.61]), t(35) = 4.39, p < 0.001, dz = 0.73, they were 
not significant following cue-only trials (mean cost 0.36% 
[− 0.91, 1.63]), t(35) = 0.58, p = 0.57, dz = 0.10. Correspond-
ingly, the repeated-measured ANOVA showed a significant 
interaction between preceding trial completion and transition, 
F(1,35) = 18.60, p < 0.001, 2
G
 = 0.04. Overall, switch trials 
produced a higher percentage of errors than did repeat trials, 
F(1,35) = 13.23, p < 0.001, 2
G
  = 0.05, and there was a higher 
percentage of errors following completed trials than following 
cue-only trials, F(1,35) = 7.80, p = 0.008, 2
G
  = 0.03.
Analysis 2: Effect of current preparation interval 
on switch costs; CCI‑controlled (see footnote 1)
There was not a significantly different RISC effect in the 
RT data between preceding trial completion conditions 
(three-way interaction), F(1,35) = 0.74, p = 0.40, 2
G
 < 0.001 
 (BF10 = 0.252). Every other effect tested in this ANOVA, 
however, was significant. Thus, there was an overall 
switch cost, F(1,35) = 50.64, p < 0.001, 2
G
 = 0.04, that 
was significantly modified by preceding trial completion, 
F(1,35) = 15.96, p < 0.001, 2
G
 = 0.01, due to the switch cost 
(collapsed across preparation interval) being larger following 
completed trials (mean 97 ms) than following cue-only trials 
(29 ms). RTs were significantly faster overall following com-
pleted trials than following cue-only trials, F(1,35) = 127.88, 
p < 0.001, 2
G
 = 0.23. Increasing preparation time benefitted 
response speed, F(1,35) = 60.50, p < 0.001, 2
G
 = 0.10, and 
9 For this analysis, the term “transition” refers to the relationship 
between the task relevant to the current trial on which performance 
is measured (always a CT or TO trial) and the previously cued task. 
This means that for sequences where the current task was prepared, 
i.e., [CT or TO] → CO → TO, transition is between the task on the 
current TO trial and the task on trial n – 2, CT or TO, and not the task 
on trial n − 1, which is effectively acting as the cue for the current 
trial.
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more so following completed trials than following cue-only 
trials, F(1,35) = 10.74, p = 0.002, 2
G
 = 0.009. Finally, the 
RISC effect itself was significant overall, F(1,35) = 8.52, 
p = 0.006, 2
G
 = 0.006: RISC effect overall, 51 ms. (Analysis 
3 below describes the separate analysis of the RISC effect 
in RT data following completed trials only.)
In the error data, the three-way interaction was not sig-
nificant, F(1,35) < 0.01, p = 0.98, 2
G
 < 0.001  (BF10 = 0.179). 
Hence, as with the RT data, there was no statistical evidence 
for the idea that switch costs following cue-only trials are 
more easily overcome than those following completed tri-
als. Overall, there was a significant cost of switching tasks, 
F(1,35) = 20.00, p < 0.001, 2
G
 = 0.04. This effect inter-
acted significantly with that of preceding trial completion, 
F(1,35) = 24.57, p < 0.001, 2
G
 = 0.03, such that the switch 
cost was larger following completed trials (mean 5.51%) 
than cue-only trials (0.65%). There were fewer errors over-
all following cue-only than completed trials, F(1,35) = 4.49, 
p = 0.04, 2
G
 = 0.02. The overall effect of preparation inter-
val was, unusually, that errors were more common with a 
long than with a short preparation interval, F(1,35) = 12.13, 
p = 0.001, 2
G
 = 0.02. The effect of preparation interval did 
not interact with preceding trial completion, F(1,35) = 0.31, 
p = 0.58, 2
G
 < 0.001, or with transition, F(1,35) = 0.20, 
p = 0.65, 2
G
 < 0.001; thus, there was not a significant over-
all RISC effect in the error data (average RISC − 0.60%). 
(Analysis 3 below describes the separate analysis of the 
RISC effect in error data following completed trials only.)
N.B. In the above analyses, we collapsed data over the 
two “long” preparation intervals (1000 ms and 2400 ms) to 
achieve sufficient trial numbers per condition per participant 
(see data processing). Since switch costs were not identical 
across these intervals, we report them here for information 
only, as indicated in the preregistration document. Mean RT 
switch costs were as follows: following completed trials at 
the 1000 ms preparation interval (PI), 69 ms, 95% CI [9, 
129] and at 2400 ms PI, 49 ms [− 26, 124]; following cue-
only trials at 1000 ms PI, − 7 ms, [− 52, 37] and at 2400 ms 
PI, 30 ms, [− 11, 72]. Mean % error switch costs were as fol-
lows: following completed trials at 1000 ms PI, 7.77%, 95% 
CI [1.35, 14.18] and at 2400 ms PI, 0.23% [− 8.77, 9.23]; 
following cue-only trials at 1000 ms PI, − 0.40%, [− 3.15, 
2.34] and at 2400 ms PI, 2.52%, [0.06, 4.98].
Analysis 3: RISC effect following completed trials 
only; non‑controlled (see footnote 1)
The data for this analysis are shown in Table 3 (switch cost 
column). The average RT RISC effect in this analysis was 
a substantial 69 ms, 95% CI [46, 92] and the one-tailed 
test for a positive RISC effect was significant, t(35) = 6.14, 
p < 0.001, dz = 1.02. Thus, we have reason to believe that 
participants did use the preparation interval, when it was 
present, to prepare for the upcoming task. However, there 
was a small negative RISC effect in the error data (see 
Table 3) of − 1.24% errors, 95% CI [− 3.03, 0.54]. No one-
tailed t-test was run on these data since the effect was not in 
the predicted direction.
Discussion
In Experiment 3, there was once again a significant cost of 
switching tasks following preparation alone (cue-only trials). 
For the first time in this series of studies, however, the switch 
cost following performance was significantly larger than that 
following preparation alone, and this was the case in terms 
of both RT and errors. At the 0 ms preparation interval, the 
RT cost was more than twice as large following completed 
trials than following cue-only trials (130 ms vs 47 ms). The 
implications of this finding for models of task-switching are 
discussed below (general discussion).
The switch cost at the short/zero preparation interval 
following completed trials (130 ms) was far larger in this 
experiment than it had been in both Experiments 1 (44 ms) 
and 2 (53 ms). This may be because the likelihood of hav-
ing to switch tasks to process any target stimulus was lower 
than it had been in Experiments 1 and 2: this is because 
targets could now immediately follow other targets, all such 
instances requiring task repetition. It has been shown that 
Table 3  Data for Experiment 
3, Analysis 3: RISC effect 
following completed trials only
See Fig. 3 for relevant trial sequences from which these data were obtained. Switch costs were calculated 
prior to rounding
Preparation interval Repeat Switch Switch cost
M SD M SD M SD
RT (ms)
 0 ms 854 141 981 158 126 55
 1000, 2400 ms 900 157 957 162 57 50
Errors (%)
 0 ms 3.61 2.90 10.09 5.90 6.48 4.22
 1000, 2400 ms 7.41 5.06 15.13 7.28 7.73 4.69
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reducing the overall likelihood of switching tasks increases 
the measured switch cost, perhaps because participants 
are less likely to switch preemptively before the next cue 
is shown (Monsell and Mizon, 2006). There was no corre-
sponding increase following cue-only trials: the switch cost 
here was 47 ms at the short/zero preparation interval com-
pared with 40 ms in Experiment 1 and 67 ms in Experiment 
2. Possibly, any effect of reduced switch:repeat ratio in terms 
of increasing the subsequent switch cost was counteracted 
by an opposite effect, decreasing the cost following cue-only 
trials specifically. That is, there was an increased likelihood 
in this experiment (relative to Experiments 1 and 2) of a cue 
presented alone being followed by another cue (rather than 
by a target), thereby increasing the relative likelihood of an 
immediate subsequent task-switch.
There was no evidence here to support the hypothesis 
that switch costs would be more rapidly overcome during 
preparation on the current trial following preparation versus 
performance of the preceding task. The RT RISC effect was 
in fact numerically larger following completed than cue-
only trials (the opposite of the effect required to support that 
hypothesis) and there was neither an overall nor a differential 
RISC effect in the error data.
General discussion
In this series of experiments, we aimed to compare the 
effects of preparing a task with those of completing a pre-
pared task on the subsequent switch cost, while removing 
or otherwise controlling for a number of confounds that had 
been present in previous studies. It seemed plausible that 
those confounds could have made the switch cost seen previ-
ously following preparation unrealistically large relative to 
that seen following performance. Across the three experi-
ments, we found that the relative size of switch costs shifted 
from being bigger following preparation to being bigger 
following performance, while a significant cost remained 
following both preparation and performance in all three 
experiments.
The relative size of switch costs subsequent to preparing 
versus performing a task is highly relevant to the question 
of the extent to which our behaviour is controlled by volun-
tary, endogenous factors on the one hand and performance-
related or exogenous factors on the other. Two-stage models 
of task-switching (e.g. Meiran, 2000; Rogers and Monsell, 
1995; Rubinstein, Meyer, and Evans, 2001) posit that voli-
tion is limited in terms of enabling us to overcome a switch 
cost, with some aspect of task performance being required to 
fully switch between tasks. Analogously, one might expect 
a similar separation in terms of establishing a subsequent 
switch cost, such that whereas preparation might produce 
some cost of switching on the next trial, it should not be able 
to produce the full cost unless accompanied by some aspect 
of performance such as response-selection (c.f. Lenartowicz 
et al., 2011; Schuch and Koch, 2003). However, the data 
thus far have not borne out this expectation. Studies where, 
on the preceding trial, preparation was followed by a no-go 
stimulus have tended to show completely absent switch costs 
on the current trial (thereby favouring models where persist-
ing effects stem from performance rather than preparation, 
e.g., Allport and Wylie, 2000). Studies with cue-only trials, 
where preparation is abruptly followed by the next trial, have 
tended to show that switch costs are larger, not smaller, than 
those seen following performance (thereby favouring models 
where persisting effects stem from preparation rather than 
performance, e.g., Altmann and Gray, 2008).
In this set of studies, we consistently found (as have previ-
ous studies with cue-only trials) significant switch costs to 
be present following trials on which a task was prepared but 
not performed. Hence, these data add to the weight of evi-
dence that performance-related processes such as response-
selection are not a necessary precondition for subsequent 
switch costs to exist, at least at short/zero current preparation 
intervals. We concur with Lenartowicz, Yeung, and Cohen 
(2011) in concluding that preparation is sufficient to drive 
subsequent switch costs. This finding fits both with two-
stage and preparation-based models inasmuch as it indicates 
that endogenous task-preparation has a significant impact 
on task-readiness, and it seems rather less consistent with 
models where processes occurring during performance are 
responsible for driving subsequent switch costs (e.g. Allport 
and Wylie, 2000).
However, we were initially unable to generate switch 
costs that were larger following performance than following 
preparation alone. That is the situation one might expect if, 
as the two-stage (as well as the largely performance-based) 
models suggest, performing a task results in a more pro-
found shift in our relative readiness to perform that task 
again than preparation alone can produce. In Experiments 
1 and 2, removing a substantial response-cue interval and 
controlling for cue-cue intervals resulted only in switch costs 
becoming equivalent between conditions. In Experiment 3, 
we also matched the likelihood of a task-switch immediately 
following preparation versus performance of a task and here 
the predicted pattern emerged. Switch costs were signifi-
cantly larger following completed than following cue-only 
trials. These data are consistent with a mechanism whereby 
task-performance affects an aspect of task-readiness that 
remains unaffected by volition alone. These data also sug-
gest that the patterns seen in previous experiments, where 
switch costs following cue-only trials were larger than those 
following completed trials, may well have been produced by 
unbalanced timing and predictability factors. Hence, we sug-
gest these data show that two-stage task-switching models 
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are consistent with research showing even large switch costs 
following cue-only trials.
It might seem as though our data from Experiment 
3, showing increase of switch cost following trials that 
involve performance as well as preparation, must contra-
dict models that place the weight of the switch cost at the 
stage of preparation, such as that of Altmann and Gray 
(2008; see also Schneider and Logan, 2005). But we do 
not think that is necessarily so. We do not claim to have 
eliminated all potential biases that might affect the relative 
sizes of switch costs, and it is possible therefore that we 
are now underestimating the size of the switch cost fol-
lowing preparation relative to that following performance. 
First, we were not able to match cue-cue interval (CCI) 
across preceding trial completion conditions in any of our 
experiments: in our CCI-controlled analyses this interval 
was always somewhat longer following cue-only trials than 
following completed trials. As our analyses show (and as 
Altmann and Gray’s model seems to predict), longer inter-
vals between the cue on the preceding trial and the cue on 
the current trial tend to reduce the size of switch costs. 
Second, it is possible that participants might actually have 
prepared to a lesser extent, or less consistently across tri-
als, on cue-only trials than they did on completed trials. 
Although we took steps to encourage advance preparation 
(including using only a short cue duration; Verbruggen, 
Liefooghe, Vandierendonck, and Demanet, 2007), partici-
pants might potentially have delayed part of the prepara-
tion process until after target onset rather than preparing 
fully in advance, on at least some cue-only trials. If this 
was the case, these participants would have on average 
prepared to a greater extent by the end of completed than 
by the end of cue-only trials (since, presumably, prepara-
tion of the cued task would have had to take place at some 
point for that task to be used on a completed trial). It is 
plausible, therefore, that the increased size of the switch 
cost following completed (versus cue-only) trials seen in 
Experiment 3 could be partly due to the subsequent effects 
of increased preparation, rather than only of additional 
performance, on completed trials. This issue is potentially 
important wherever a condition ostensibly measuring the 
effect of preparation, but not actually requiring it, is com-
pared with a condition on which preparation is obliga-
tory. For instance, Verbruggen, McAndrew, Weidemann, 
Stevens and McLaren (2016) showed that motor excit-
ability and costs of switching from no-go to go responses 
were apparently driven by performance on the preced-
ing trial rather than by what could have been very con-
fidently predicted to happen on the current trial. Those 
authors point out that top–down control is effortful, and 
so will not always be undertaken. Indeed, one of the key 
explanations of the residual switch cost is that of de Jong 
(2000; also cited by Verbruggen et al., 2016), whereby 
occasional “failures-to-engage” during a preparation inter-
val, possibly due simply to a lack of motivation, create 
what appears to be a fundamental restriction on the limits 
of endogenous control during task-switching. Altmann and 
Gray’s (2008) model uses the failure-to-engage idea to 
produce the residual switch cost, with the cost stemming 
from occasional lapses in pre-target cue identification on 
switch trials without there being any requirement for a 
performance-driven process to complete a task-switch. In 
our experiments, then, it is simply not clear yet whether 
performance necessarily produces a larger subsequent 
switch cost than preparation does (in line with two-stage 
switching theory) or whether there may be a single switch-
ing process that can occur during preparation, responsible 
for driving the full subsequent switch cost, but which is 
more likely to take place when a task has to be completed 
than when it does not.
We have focussed primarily upon the size of switch 
costs measured on trials with short preparation inter-
vals, because this is where the unexpectedly large costs 
following cue-only trials have been seen before (Lenar-
towicz et al., 2011; Swainson et al., 2017). However, it 
might be argued that any additional subsequent effects 
of performance should only be evident at longer prepara-
tion intervals, since it is the “residual” switch cost (that 
remaining after substantial preparation time on the current 
trial) that, by definition, is only eliminated by performance 
(e.g. Rogers and Monsell, 1995). In practice, however, the 
residual cost measure is a difficult one to use, since it is 
not always easy to determine when sufficient preparation 
time has been provided to enable the residual cost to be 
reached (c.f. Swainson and Martin, 2013). In the current 
experiments, we chose to use the steepness of decline in 
switch cost with increasing preparation interval (i.e., the 
size of the RISC effect) as an alternative way of assessing 
whether preparation and performance generated different 
types of subsequent switch cost. We reasoned that a cost 
driven only by prior preparation might be rapidly over-
come during preparation on the current trial, whereas one 
that was driven by prior performance might be resistant to 
the effects of current preparation alone. There was a hint in 
the data from Experiment 2 that such a pattern existed (a 
numerically steeper RISC effect following cue-only than 
completed trials), but it was not supported statistically. 
Further research in this direction might prove fruitful to 
determine whether the nature of the switch cost preceded 
only by task-preparation differs qualitatively from that pre-
ceded by performance of a prepared task.
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Conclusion
These experiments confirm that preparing but not perform-
ing a particular task is sufficient to produce a switch cost on 
the next trial. The relative size of the switch costs following 
preparation versus performance changed across the series 
of experiments, consistent with the hypothesis that unbal-
anced timings and event probabilities had contributed to the 
previous finding of surprisingly large switch costs follow-
ing cue-only trials. The larger switch cost following perfor-
mance than following preparation seen in the third experi-
ment is consistent with two-stage models of task-switching 
that propose a special role for performance in task-control. 
However, we may now be overestimating the size of the 
switch cost following completed trials relative to that fol-
lowing cue-only trials. Different methods may be required 
to establish whether there are meaningful qualitative dif-
ferences in the types of switch cost driven by preparation 
versus performance.
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